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PHISHGAN: DATA AUGMENTATION AND IDENTIFICATION OF HOMOGLPYH ATTACKS
ABSTRACT
Homoglyph attacks are a common technique used by hackers
to conduct phishing. Domain names or links that are visu-
ally similar to actual ones are created via punycode to obfus-
cate the attack, making the victim more susceptible to phish-
ing. For example, victims may mistake ”—inkedin.com” for
”linkedin.com” and in the process, divulge personal details to
the fake website. Current State of The Art (SOTA) typically
make use of string comparison algorithms (e.g. Levenshtein
Distance), which are computationally heavy. One reason for
this is the lack of publicly available datasets thus hindering
the training of more advanced Machine Learning (ML) mod-
els. Furthermore, no one font is able to render all types of
punycode correctly, posing a significant challenge to the cre-
ation of a dataset that is unbiased toward any particular font.
This coupled with the vast number of internet domains pose
a challenge in creating a dataset that can capture all possi-
ble variations. Here, we show how a conditional Generative
Adversarial Network (GAN), PhishGAN, can be used to gen-
erate images of hieroglyphs, conditioned on non-homoglpyh
input text images. Practical changes to current SOTA were re-
quired to facilitate the generation of more varied homoglyph
text-based images. We also demonstrate a workflow of how
PhishGAN together with a Homoglyph Identifier (HI) model
can be used to identify the domain the homoglyph was trying
to imitate. Furthermore, we demonstrate how PhishGAN’s
ability to generate datasets on the fly facilitate the quick adap-
tation of cybersecurity systems to detect new threats as they
emerge.
Index Terms— Generative Adversarial Networks, Cyber-
security, Lookalike domains, Homoglyph
1. INTRODUCTION
A common type of phishing attack involves permuting al-
phabets of the same Latin characters family. These are
also commonly known as look-alike domains, or typo-
squatting. In a study by Dhamija et al. [1], researchers
fooled 90.9% of their participants by hosting a website at
”www.bankofthevvest[.]com”, with two ”v’s instead of a ”w”
in the domain name, showcasing the effectiveness of this
strategy.
Based on lookalike and typosquatted attack types, the cur-
rent industry accepted approach is to calculate the edit dis-
tance between strings. Equation (1) shows two sample do-
mains which are 1 Levenshtein edit distance away from ”face-
book.com”. In this method, a lower Levenshtein value indi-
cates more similar domains, increasing the confidence of a
phishing attempt.
ld(”facebook.com”, ”face4book.com”) = 1
ld(”facebook.com”, ”faceb0ok.com”) = 1
(1)
However, the edit distance method fails when the at-
tackers utilize homoglyph attacks (a subset of lookalike at-
tacks), which uses characters not within the Latin characters
group. For example, the domains ”fa´cebook.com” and ”face-
booZ.com” while both 1 edit distance from ”facebook.com”,
have different visual characteristics.
As most modern browsers support the display of Interna-
tionalized Domain Names (IDN), domain names with digits
and other special characters can all be registered. IDNs are
converted to their Latin character equivalent in the form of
punycodes. Though extremely useful in facilitating domain
names of various languages, it opens up the possibility of cy-
ber attacks, particularly, homoglyph attacks. The homoglyph
attack vector comes into play when there is a mixture of char-
acters that look similar to their Latin counterparts. As shown
in Table 1, it is not easy to differentiate the homoglyphs and
their original domains.
Table 1. Domains with Replaced Characters
Original Replaced Punycode Visualized
facebook.com ”a” to ”a´” xn--fcebook-
hwa.com
fa´cebook.com
google.com ”l” to ”ł” xn--googe-
n7a.com
googłe.com
imda.gov.sg ”i” to ”ı” xn--mda-
iua.gov.sg
ımda.gov.sg
As homoglpyh attacks have been on the rise since 20001,
Many techniques have been proposed in the literature to de-
tect such attacks. Suzuki et al. [2] studied the similarity be-
1https://www.digitalinformationworld.com/2020/03/phishing-hackers-
continue-to-use-homoglyph-characters-in-domain-names-to-trick-users.html
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tween single characters and evaluated their pair wise similar-
ity based on mean squared error. They then tuned their al-
gorithm by getting humans to evaluate similarity of character
pairs. A major drawback of this is that the string of words
wasn’t taken into account as similarity comparisons was done
at character level. Furthermore, the authors opined that a
combination of homoglyphs could affect the confusability of
homoglyph strings. In this work, the lack of a large dataset
was a major problem, hence the need for human labellers.
Woodbridge et al. [3] showed that a Siamese CNN was
able to detect and classify homoglyph attacks. He also con-
tributed a dataset containing pairs of real and spoofed do-
mains renderable in Arial. Though extremely useful for the
purpose of training ML algorithms, the major drawback is
that it is inherently biased towards Arial font. This means
that punycode that could be rendered by other fonts are not
taken into account. Deep learning models trained on such a
dataset would have a bias towards Arial font. Creating a cu-
rated dataset for multiple fonts would be extremely tedious
and may not be efficient, as it would again be biased towards
those fonts.
Thus, we propose to make use of state-of-the-art GAN
algorithms to extend Woodbridge et al.’s dataset to produce
potentially infinite possibilities of homoglyphs. Though there
may not be a way to render these GAN generated homoglyphs
in punycode, we expect that GAN generated data would pro-
vide significantly more variability to the dataset such that ML
algorithms would not be constrained or limited to variations
of any particular font.
We highlight our 3 main contributions. Our major contri-
bution is PhishGAN, which can generate realistic text images
of homoglpyhs. We show that PhishGAN is able to produce
a more varied set of homoglpyh images than naively apply-
ing SOTA algorithms like Pix2Pix and CycleGAN. Although
there may not be a valid punycode to produce PhishGAN’s
output images, it is extremely useful in serving the purpose
of dataset augmentation for data-intensive deep learning al-
gorithms to train on.
Our second contribution is an extensive validation of
PhishGAN’s output via a Homoglyph Identifier (HI), which
is intended to detect and classify which domain a homoglyph
was trying to mimic. We aim to show a model would be
able to identify and classify real-life homoglyphs after being
trained on just data generated by PhishGAN. Other than us-
ing triplet loss over paired loss, the HI is largely similar to
Woodbridge et al.’s work.
Our final contribution is a realistic scenario testing, show-
ing how PhishGAN’s ability to generate dataset on the fly can
help cybersecurity systems adapt quickly to new emerging
threats.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETUP
In this section, we briefly review the current SOTA condi-
tional GANs, particularly Pix2Pix and CycleGAN and intro-
duce the mathematical formulation of our problem.
Pix2Pix and CycleGAN are the closest related works
to PhishGAN and they belong to the family of conditional
GANS, whose outputs are conditioned on an input. These 2
models were experimented on extensively to determine the
vital components to produce visually realistic homoglyphs.
Pix2Pix is a conditional GAN algorithm developed by
Isola et al. [4] with the aim to translate input images into re-
alistic output images. For example, given outline sketches
of objects, it is able to include colours and produce realistic
looking images as shown in Figure 1. Isola et al. made use
of paired images; his dataset contains input sketch-like im-
ages and desired photo realistic ground truth images. As the
images are paired, one could simply minimise the L1 loss be-
tween the ground truth and the network output described in
(2)
Fig. 1. Pix2Pix trained with different loss
Fig. 2. UNet Neural Network Architecture
LL1 = ||y −G(x, z)|| (2)
In (2), x is the input sketch like image, z is the noise vec-
tor added to allow for variation, G is the generator function
that generates an output image given x and z as inputs. Fi-
nally, y is the target output image. The generator function, G,
is typically realised via a UNet CNN architecture as shown in
Figure 2. An input image x is first passed through CNN layers
to reduce its dimensions to a low dimensional space. At the
smallest dimension, a noise tensor is concatenated channel-
wise and it is then upsampled via convolution transpose lay-
ers to produce a tensor of the same size and shape as the input
x. At each upsampling stage, the corresponding tensor at the
downsampling stage is concatenated channel-wise to the up-
sampled tensor. Like ResNet architectures [5], UNets facili-
tate gradient backpropagation through neural networks.
Isola et al. showed that with the above architecture and
simply minimising the L1 loss function, blurry images could
be produced (see Figure 1. Isola et al. then added on a dis-
criminator, trained to classify whether images are generated
or real. This is easily achieved by training a CNN in a su-
pervised way (i.e. ”real” images tagged as ”0” and ”fake”
images generated by the generator tagged as ”1”). The gen-
erator’s objective function is then augmented with a loss that
describes its ability to fool the discriminator, (3).
G∗ = minGlog(D(x, y))+ log(1−D(G(x, z))+LL1 (3)
The discriminator objective function2 is as follows:
D∗ = maxDlog(D(x, y)) + log(1−D(G(x, z)) (4)
Zhu et al. [6] relaxed the need for paired images in Cy-
cleGAN; it only requires samples of x’s and y’s. It is es-
sentially a combination of 2 Pix2Pix networks as shown in
Figure 3. In particular G and DG are as previously described
by Pix2Pix where G aims to generate y, with input x, while
DG aims to determine whether the y’s are generated by G or
not. There is however, another set of generator (F ) and dis-
criminator (DF ). The function, F , aims is to generate x from
y and DF aims to determine if x’s are generated by F or not.
Fig. 3. High level training concept for CycleGAN
The objective function for the discriminators are same as
before, while the generators have 2 loss terms in place of L1:
1. Cycle Consistency loss: Lc = ||F (G(x, zG)) − x|| +
||G(F (y, zF ) − y||. This loss3 puts a constraint such
2Note that the discriminator function also takes in the conditional image
x, indicating that its classification is also conditioned on x.
3zG and zF refer to the noise tensors added to generator functions G and
F respectively
that an input image x after being processed by G and F
sequentially should be x. Similarly, an input image y,
after being processed by F andG should be y. This loss
acts as a regularisation loss to limit the search space
while optimizing G and F . It is added to the loss func-
tion of both G and F .
2. Identity losses: LI,G = ||G(y, zG) − y||, LI,F =
||F (x, zF ) − x||. These constrains that passing an im-
age y to G should yield y as G aims to produce images
that are from the y’s dataset, and vice versa for F . LI,G
is added to the loss function of G while LI,F is added
to the loss function of F .
Zhu et al. [6] showed that CycleGAN was able to ”morph”
images of horses (x) to zebras (y), without paired images.
Both Pix2Pix and CycleGANs have been tested on photo
images. However, to the best of our knowledge, there is
no GAN in the literature that looks at morphing text based
images. In this work, we investigate the applicability of
both Pix2Pix and CycleGAN for our use case of generating
”glyphed” text images from real images. The ability to do this
will essentially allow us to generate an infinite homoglyph
dataset.
Related to our second and third contributions is Wood-
bridge et al.’s [3] work on using Siamese CNN to detect ho-
moglyph strings by checking whether the L2 distance of their
encodings versus the encodings of a checking list of strings is
below a certain threshold4. Siamese CNN aims to extract fea-
tures from images into a single vector. This is represented as
follows: S(i) = e where S is the CNN function that encodes
an image i into encoding e. The network S is then trained on
pair loss, which is the L2 distance between 2 encoding. For
pairs of strings that have been labelled to be similar, we min-
imise theL2 distance while for pairs of strings that are dissim-
ilar, we maximise the L2 distance. This loss function is also
known as contrastive loss. A drawback is that it doesn”t place
an upper bound on how far to segregate 2 differing points.
Thus, it isn”t optimal if 2 points, which are already at the
centre of their respective clusters are pushed further away and
out of their clusters. The triplet loss has been shown to pro-
duce better encoding than the contrastive loss over a variety
of use cases [7]. Thus, in this work, we make use of the triplet
loss to train S5.
4If so, a homoglyph detection is flagged and it is classified as the checking
list item with the smallest L2 distance.
5As mentioned earlier, we will not be comparing the advantages of the
triplet loss over the contrastive loss in this work. Instead, we will use it to
train a HI to show possible use cases of PhishGAN and also to validate its
output.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. PhishGAN
PhishGAN’s aims to generate homoglyphs given any Latin
based input text string. To overcome the bias a manually cre-
ated dataset may have toward any one font, PhishGAN should
also be able to accept strings of multiple fonts and output
homoglyphs corresponding to such fonts. We make use of
Woodbridge et al.’s contributed domain dataset that contains
pairs of domains and possible homoglyphs renderable by Ar-
ial font. Our workflow for PhishGAN is shown in Figure 4.
Fig. 4. Workflow for PhishGAN
A domain string is first rendered into a greyscale image,
of shape 40 × 400 × 1, using a certain font via the Python
Pillow package. We also perform data augmentation by ran-
domly shifting the text around the 40× 400× 1 image. Next,
the rendered image, x, together with a noise tensor (z) is fed
to a generator function, based on the UNet architecture, to
produce image G(x, z). Our UNet architecture is shown in
Table 2. Batch normalisation is done between every convolu-
tional layer.
Table 2. UNet Architecture
Filters Stride Kernel Convolution
Type
Dropout
Rate
16 [1,2] [10,10] Conv2D 0
16 [2,2] [10,10] Conv2D 0
16 [2,2] [10,10] Conv2D 0
16 [2,2] [10,10] Conv2D 0
256 [2,2] [10,10] Conv2DTranspose 0.1
128 [2,2] [10,10] Conv2DTranspose 0.1
64 [2,2] [10,10] Conv2DTranspose 0.1
1 [1,2] [10,10] Conv2DTranspose 0.1
The input to the UNet is the 40 × 400 × 1 greyscale im-
age, normalized to between −1 and 1. 512 channels of ran-
domly generated Gaussian noise were concatenated channel-
wise to the tensor output of the final 2D Convolution layer. As
such 528 channels will be fed to the first convolution trans-
pose layer to eventually reconstruct a 40 × 400 × 1 image
tensor. Leaky Relu was used as the activation function be-
tween each layer, except the final layer where a Tanh activa-
tion was used.
Next, a discriminator was trained to identify whether the
input image is real or fake as shown in Figure 5. Table 3
shows the details of the discriminator network architecture.
Fig. 5. Sample Real & Generated images
Again, the Leaky Relu activation function was used for all
layers except the final layer, which was activated via a Sig-
moid function. No drop out was used. We also find that ad-
dition of batch normalisation here significantly degrades final
performance. Instance normalisation was used instead.
Table 3. Discriminator Architecture
Filters Stride Kernel Convolution
Type
16 [1,2] [3,5] Conv2D
32 [1,2] [3,5] Conv2D
32 [2,2] [3,5] Conv2D
64 [2,2] [3,5] Conv2D
64 [1,2] [3,5] Conv2D
128 [1,2] [3,5] Conv2D
128 [2,1] [3,5] Conv2D
128 - - Dense
64 - - Dense
32 - - Dense
1 - - Dense
The objective function for the generator is similar to
Pix2Pix but instead of using the L1 loss, we introduce a dot
product loss, in particular:
Ldot = flat(D(G(x, z))).f lat(y) (5)
The flat() function in (5) reshapes the image tensors to
a vector in order to calculate the dot product. It has been
found previously that such a loss function is especially useful
in preserving the style of an image [8], and is widely used in
neural style transfer algorithms. For the case of homoglyph
generation, we are trying to preserve the style of the target
image, y, but yet would like additional variations so that a
model trained with these augmented data would be less biased
toward what any particular font can render.
The generator objective function is thus as follows:
G∗ = minGlog(D(x, y))+ log(1−D(G(x, z))+Ldot (6)
For the discriminator, we find that removing the network’s
dependency on x as a condition gives better results. Thus the
objective function for the discriminator is as follows:
D∗ = maxDlog(D(y)) + log(1−D(G(x, z)) (7)
A batch size of 64 was used and the network was trained
over 25k steps.
We also tried a CycleGAN approach. However, the im-
ages produced were not as varied as the above approach,
which is based on Pix2Pix.
3.2. Homoglyph Identifier (HI)
The HI works by first encoding the input homoglyph image
into a low dimensional vector. This is done through the use of
a separately trained CNN, called the Encoder. We then apply
the Encoder to a list of domains (referred to as the checking
list), that we would like to protect against homoglyph attacks,
to get reference vectors for each domain6. Next, we calculate
the Euclidean distance between the suspect homoglyph and
each of the reference vectors. If the Euclidean distance is less
than a threshold (T ), we classify the suspect homoglyph as a
homoglyph and we identify the domain that it was trying to
mimic as the one with the smallest Euclidean distance.
Fig. 6. Encoder applied on Anchor, Positive & Negative
We employ the triplet loss to train this network. Figure
6 illustrates the triplet loss. In our formulation, we use the
outputs of PhishGAN as the anchor. The positive sample is
the example the anchor was trying to mimic in the check-
ing list while the negative sample is sampled randomly from
the checking list, with probabilities inversely proportional to
the encoding’s Euclidean distance from the anchor’s encod-
ing. Thus, an item in the checking list closer to the anchor’s
encoding (E(A)) in terms of Euclidean distance would have
a higher probability of being sampled. It is important to note
that only the output of PhishGAN is used to train the Encoder;
no hand crafted dataset is used.
Ltriplet = max(||E(A)−E(P )||2−||E(A)−E(N)||2+M, 0.0)
(8)
The Encoder is then trained via the loss function (8) [9].
It is clear from the equation that minimising Ltriplet is equiv-
alent to ensuring that the distance between E(A) and E(P )
6The checking list that we use in this paper is: [google.com, linkedin.com,
yahoo.com, wikipedia.org, apple.com, instagram.com, facebook.com, mi-
crosfot.com, twitter.com, youtube.com]
is at least smaller than the distance between E(A) and E(N)
with a margin of M . For the sake of brevity, we will not
delve into the details of how this is an improvement over the
pair loss in Siamese Networks as they are well documented in
the literature [10] [7].
In our experiments, we set M to 1 arbitrarily, thus the
threshold, T , was also set as 1. The network used for the
encoder is also a CNN network identical to the one used by
PhishGAN’s discriminator, except that 3 dense layers of 128
neurons were used instead of the 4 stated in Table 3. The fi-
nal activation of this CNN network is a linear one, which we
subsequently activate via an L2 normalisation function. This
ensures that the L2 norm of the encodings are always 1. In-
stance normalisation was used between network layers in this
network.
To analyse PhishGAN’s impact on HI, we paint the fol-
lowing scenarios:
• Scenario 1: Given a checking list of 10 domains, we
train a HI to identify homoglyphs of these domains and
showcase the results on a testing dataset created via
dnstwist7 8
• Scenario 2: Next, we add an additional unseen domain,
”covid19info.live” to the checking list. This is to ob-
serve the changes in performance due to the inclusion
of a new domain that is likely to be used by hackers for
phishing during the coronavirus pandemic in 2020.
• Scenario 3: Finally we train the HI again, using Phish-
GAN, with ”covid19info.live” added to the checking
list and observe the performance.
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first showcase sample outputs of PhishGAN for items
in the checking list that this paper uses9 and compare them
with the current SOTA. As can be seen in Figure 7, Phish-
GAN, although similar in structure to Pix2Pix, is able to
provide much more variations for training of homoglyph net-
works. The inability of CycleGAN to work shows that the
variation between the x and y domains are very small and it
may be difficult for an algorithm to automatically pick out
these subtle differences. Pix2Pix was able to show some
variation as can be seen from the small number of glyphs
added to certain strings like ”google.com”, ”apple.com”,
etc. It is obvious that PhishGAN produces the most var-
ied number of glyphs. For ”yahoo.com”, it is interesting
7https://github.com/elceef/dnstwist
8Note: For all 3 scenarios, we constrained PhishGAN to only generate
characters that Arial supports by constraining x to be rendered in Arial. This
is for fair evaluation of HI and PhishGAN, as glyphs produced by dnstwist
are guaranteed renderable by either Arial or Times only.
9As the checking list used in this paper was randomly generated based on
popular domains the team surfs, we note that ”yahoo.com”, ”wikipedia.org”
and ”microsoft.com” were not part of the data used to train PhishGAN
Fig. 7. Sample outputs of PhishGAN compared to other meth-
ods
that it was able to produce ”yaHoo.com”. It was also able
to morph ”microsoft.com” quite significantly to something
visually similar to ”mlcrosoft.com”. Finally, we showcase
PhishGAN’s ability to morph multiple fonts. It is interest-
ing to see the example of ”google.com”, which was mor-
phed to ”gooale.com”, ”youtube.com” being morphed to
”younibe.com” and ”linkedin.com” to ”iinkeain.com”.
We next use PhishGAN to train the HI. As mentioned in
the previous section, we show the performance for the 3 sce-
narios. We will use 2 evaluation metrics; first we determine
its ability in detecting homoglyphs10. Next, we determine
its ability to classify those homoglyphs that were detected to
those in the checking list. It is important to note that the same
model was used in both Scenario 1 and Scenario 2 while Sce-
nario 3 pertains to retraining a new model, taking into account
the additional domain in the checking list. All models were
trained to convergence in terms of training loss (i.e. triplet
loss).
As can be seen in Table 4, there is a degradation in ac-
curacy when moving from scenario 1 to scenario 2. This
could be due to the fact that the model was not trained on
”covid19info.live” in the checking list. Thus, it is less aware
of the type of glyphs one may expect from such a domain.
There is largely an increase in the F1 score because out of
those that were identified as homoglyphs, more were classi-
fied correctly on average. Next, we retrained the model in
scenario 3 and we see that we are able to regain the accuracy
performance and also increase F1 score. This could be due to
the larger training dataset as the model now also sees glyphs
from one other example, which may help in detecting glyphs
of another.
10It does not make sense to check the HI’s ability to pick out non homo-
glyphs as the Euclidean distance would be 0. Thus, the accuracy metric was
used to determine its ability to pick out homoglyphs.
Table 4. Accuracy & F1-Score of various Experiments and
Scenarios
Experiment Scenario
1
Scenario
2
Scenario
3
Accuracy 1 0.83 0.76 0.89
2 0.80 0.77 0.86
3 0.81 0.78 0.85
Mean
Acc
0.81 0.76 0.86
F1-Score 1 0.77 0.76 0.87
2 0.78 0.85 0.89
3 0.81 0.87 0.84
Mean F1 0.78 0.83 0.86
Fig. 8. Clustering of domains generated by PhishGAN
Finally, we showcase HI’s ability to produce meaningful
encodings of the input text based images. As can be seen
in Figure 8, the Encoder is able to encode the different ho-
moglyph images, produced by PhishGAN, into clearly dis-
cernible clusters, with each cluster corresponding to a partic-
ular domain name as shown in Figure 8. The variation within
each cluster also showcases PhishGAN’s ability to generate a
variety of homoglyphs for each string. This shows that Phish-
GAN is not suffering from mode collapse 11, a widely known
problem for GANs. On this note, it should be added that the
original Pix2Pix architecture did not include the addition of
noise tensors as the authors12 find that they do not cause sig-
nificant variations in the output, given a particular input con-
dition, x. In our case, however, the additional noise tensors
were important as they allowed varied outputs as evidenced in
Figure 8, where clusters aren’t just a single point. Finally, Fig-
ure 8 also shows why there could be misclassifications. Look-
ing at the ”linkedin.com” and ”covid19info.live” clusters, we
observe that the distance could be quite near, indicating the
possibility of classification errors.
5. CONCLUSION
We have shown how PhishGAN outperforms current SOTA
in its ability to generate homoglyphs. This was achieved by
making practical modifications to the Pix2Pix architecture:
1. Replacing L1 loss with Ldot.
2. Inclusion of noise tensors in the generator.
3. Removing condition input, x, from the discriminator.
4. Using instance normalisation for the discriminator.
We also show that we are able to get reasonable performances
using just PhishGAN generated data to train a HI. We then
showcase how adding an additional domain into the checking
list may degrade HI’s accuracy performance and how Phish-
GAN can be used to retrain the HI to regain its accuracy and
classification performance. The HI’s ability to encode the text
based images into discernible clusters was also verified by
applying t-SNE on the encodings, validating that the triplet
loss is indeed an appropriate loss for this problem setup. Fi-
nally, the variations within each cluster are also proof that
PhishGAN doesn’t suffer from mode collapse problems that
plague GANs in general. The work here has significant im-
pact for future research into homoglyph detection as it shows
that deep neural networks can also be used to generate homo-
glyphs which can in turn be used to train homoglyph detection
models and update them on the fly as new threats emerge. We
believe the work done here provides a significant alternative
11https://developers.google.com/machine-learning/
gan/problems
12https://github.com/junyanz/
pytorch-CycleGAN-and-pix2pix/issues/152
to handcrafting homoglyph datasets and can contribute signif-
icantly to the prevention of homoglyph phishing attacks. To
the best of our knowledge, this is also the first piece of work
that applies GANs to text based images, opening up a new
reserach direction for the application of GANs.
6. FUTURE WORK
Future work could extend PhishGAN to other languages. Re-
laxing the need for paired training data should be explored.
References
[1] Rachna Dhamija, J Doug Tygar, and Marti Hearst. Why
phishing works. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI con-
ference on Human Factors in computing systems, pages
581–590, 2006.
[2] Hiroaki Suzuki, Daiki Chiba, Yoshiro Yoneya, Tatsuya
Mori, and Shigeki Goto. Shamfinder: An automated
framework for detecting idn homographs. ACM Internet
Measurement Conference, 2019.
[3] Jonathan Woodbridge, Hyrum S Anderson, Anjum
Ahuja, and Daniel Grant. Detecting homoglyph attacks
with a siamese neural network. In 2018 IEEE Secu-
rity and Privacy Workshops (SPW), pages 22–28. IEEE,
2018.
[4] Phillip Isola, Jun-Yan Zhu, Tinghui Zhou, and Alexei A
Efros. Image-to-image translation with conditional ad-
versarial networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE confer-
ence on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages
1125–1134, 2017.
[5] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian
Sun. Deep residual learning for image recognition.
CoRR, abs/1512.03385, 2015. URL http://arxiv.
org/abs/1512.03385.
[6] Jun-Yan Zhu, Taesung Park, Phillip Isola, and Alexei A
Efros. Unpaired image-to-image translation using cycle-
consistent adversarial networks. In Proceedings of
the IEEE international conference on computer vision,
pages 2223–2232, 2017.
[7] Chao-Yuan Wu, R. Manmatha, Alexander J. Smola, and
Philipp Kra¨henbu¨hl. Sampling matters in deep embed-
ding learning. CoRR, abs/1706.07567, 2017. URL
http://arxiv.org/abs/1706.07567.
[8] Yongcheng Jing, Yezhou Yang, Zunlei Feng, Jingwen
Ye, Yizhou Yu, and Mingli Song. Neural style trans-
fer: A review. IEEE transactions on visualization and
computer graphics, 2019.
[9] Florian Schroff, Dmitry Kalenichenko, and James
Philbin. Facenet: A unified embedding for face recogni-
tion and clustering. In Proceedings of the IEEE confer-
ence on computer vision and pattern recognition, pages
815–823, 2015.
[10] Alexander Hermans, Lucas Beyer, and Bastian Leibe.
In defense of the triplet loss for person re-identification.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.07737, 2017.
